Grab is one of the very first ASEAN homegrown ride-hailing companies. Its growth potential has attracted a lot of investments. It received the largest amount of venture capital funds in the first quarter of 2018 across the world, including a massive $2 billion led by the Japanese multinational conglomerate Softbank and China's DiDi Chuxing ). Grab's valuation skyrocketed from $1 billion USD from 2014, a year after its founding in 2013, to $6 billion USD in 2017, which made it the highest-valued technological startup in ASEAN (Russell, 2017) . By 2018, the Grab mobile app has already been downloaded for over 11 million times, available in over 190 cities in 5 languages, saved its customers over 50% commute time on average (Smith, 2018) , and obtained over 220 business partners (Lim, 2018) . Grab's introduction of the online payment gateway, GrabPay, in 2017 is foreseen to hugely revolutionise and liberate the heavily cash-based ASEAN community, where only a quarter of the 600 million population have a bank account (Reinmueller, 2016) .
Both Grab and Uber entered ASEAN in 2013 and competed fiercely since then to conquer the market. In spite of Uber's apparent advantages in its setup and resources, Grab was able to outrace Uber through its better understanding of local market needs, and more effective response to regulatory control.
The victory of Grab was far more significant in the ride-hailing industry, compared with Uber's previous defeat by DiDi in China and by Yandex in Russia. This is because the battle between Grab and Uber was played out across several ASEAN countries, where jurisdiction fully differs and there is no central jurisdiction to favor Grab.
The content below does not take reference from conventional business theory, considering the new and constantly expanding business model of Grab. This analysis is intended to support the belief that a good understanding and willingness to serve the constantly evolving market needs far outweighs the effectiveness and importance of adhering to any business models, regardless of how successful the models were proven to achieve a sustainable business success in the past or in elsewhere.
The Rise of Sharing Economy -a P2P Business Model
Many new business models emerged in recent years as a result of new technologies like A.I., with sharing economy being one of them. Sharing economy has a high growth potential as it creates business opportunities through a more sensible, flexible, and economic utilisation of currently existing resources, which makes it highly scalable and applicable in many industries. According to "The Current and Future State of the Sharing Economy" report by the Brookings Institute in 2016, the market share of sharing economy companies in their sectors is estimated to increase almost 10 times from 6.25% in 2013 to about 50% in 2025, which largely eclipses the growth rate in other traditional industries.
Ride-hailing Shaping the Future of the Transport Market
Ride-hailing is chosen among all kinds of sharing economy since it has the highest growth potential, while it is also highly compatible with human psychology in sharing private ownership. According to a report by Goldman Sachs on "Rethinking Mobility" in 2017, it is estimated the ride-hailing industry worldwide will increase by 8 times to $285 billion by 2030. The industry also has strong growth potential given that the value of the global taxi market is estimated to be $108 billion USD -three times the size of the $36-billion ride-hailing current market. By 2030, companies would achieve $65 billion USD revenue when they obtain 23% commission of the gross market sales, based on Goldman Sach's estimates, despite of concern that autonomous cars could bring down the cost of rides. This is in parallel to Uber, the world leading ride-hailing company, being valued as the highest-valued private company in 2017. Car sharing also comes naturally in terms of human behavior. According to a report by PwC on "Shared benefits" in 2016, car sharing is the most feasible consumer behavior as compared to other sharing behaviors like sharing accommodation, gifts, or home furnishings, with details illustrated in Figure 1 . 
Ride-hailing Rising into Prominence in Asia
With reference to Statista, one of the world's most successful statistics databases, Asia excluding China is portrayed as underexplored in terms of ride-hailing industry's revenue and user penetration when compared with the global market, as shown in Figure 2 
ASEAN as the Incubator of Possibilities in Ride-hailing
ASEAN is an underexplored area in Asia with a strong growth potential for ridehailing. According to studies conducted by Google and Temasek, Singapore's largest and sovereign wealth fund, the ASEAN ride-hailing market is expected to be worth up to $13.1 billion in 2025, which will be more than ten-fold of its value in 2015, $2.5 billion (Minter, 2017) . In addition, ASEAN is currently the world's fourth largest internet-based market, with over 320 million citizens online and the number is growing rapidly fuelled by abundant young and middle-class population who are willing to try out new technology and invention (Minter, 2017) . The population of middle class has already doubled from 40 million in 2010 to 80 million in 2017 according to Nielsen's "ASEAN 2015 -Seeing Around the Corner in a New Asian Landscape" report.
Development Timeline of Grab
The below comparison traces the development of Grab and its major competitor, Uber. Local competitors are listed in Appendix II. Grab, being one of the very first ASEAN companies to enter the ride-hailing business, encountered many tough tasks right from the start. Although one of the founders of Grab is the descendent of Malaysia's prominent automobile tycoons, the two founders still had to go door to door to search for their first local taxi partners, in order to provide the Grab platform with a sizeable fleet of drivers to timely pick up customers' orders. Due to lack of local ride-hailing regulation and the ambiguous attitude by local regulators, Grab was first positioned to mainly connect customers with licensed taxi drivers, while private freelance drivers could also sign up to the platform. Although effort was also paid to attract individual drivers, gaining trust from a credible local venture was far more important. This is because it would not only help to gravatise more drivers and customers to the platform, but would also be a huge boost to prepare Grab to compete against Uber in the long run, which was by then already presiding in over 50 international markets. During the search for local partners, the founders came across many people who do not think that Grab will be successful. Still, they worked hard and by the time they approached the fifth company, Grab finally got their first partnership and first group of drivers on its platform (Lee, 2014) . Although the company only owned a small fleet of 30 taxis, it was a victorious moment as it encouraged the founders to continue with their effort of enduring in the ride-hailing race. In March 2016, around 10,000 Indonesian taxi drivers and 500 Malaysian taxi drivers went on a full-fledged protest against the biased regulation on Uber and Grab (by then still GrabCar) as well as the fierce competition brought by the two to the taxi industry. Such was ensued by serious traffic blockage, violent conflict, and later stricter control on Grab and Uber. The sudden eruption of this unprecedented anger from the taxi industry was mainly due to the price cutting competition between Uber and Grab, which competed to give public almost free (less than 0.1 USD per ride) riding experience for the first time in early 2016. This led to a drastic cut down of revenue of taxi drivers.
Malaysian government's response was rather lackluster, so the revised legislation finally debuted in 2017. Yet, the scene in Indonesia was far more radical. Right after the protest, the Indonesian government temporarily banned Uber and Grab, followed by rolling out a lengthy decree. Direct partnership or recruitment of private individual drivers was officially outlawed and could only be achieved through more costly and complicated liaison with local registered transport entities. Coupled with that was more restrictive regulation on driver registration, safety check, drivers' employment term, and data disclosure (Freischlad, 2016) . This was a huge setback for Uber and Grab as it largely obliterated their flexibility in expanding into Indonesia -the most populated market in ASEAN.
However, what mattered was Grab and Uber's response to the crisis. Immediately, Grab promised to comply with the new regulation by planning to introduce a cooperative to get local partners on board, while Uber failed to give any prompt reply although it later also complied with the regulation (Chilkoti, 2016) . The failure of giving immediate response to the legislator is ineffective, if not damaging, to confine the impact of the crisis and secure trusty relationship with local legislator. This demonstrated that Grab was more skillful than Uber in liaising with local regulator, which is crucial as a good relationship with local regulator would save lots of trouble.
In fact before 2016, there was no existing clear legislation on ride-hailing in the whole ASEAN at all, and liaison with local government did not play a great part in influencing ride-hailing companies' day-to-day operation. However, after 2016, more legislation came into place and communication with local government on legislative control become increasingly important. As Uber was less adapted to communicate with local regulator than Grab, Uber was subjected to more severe restriction than Grab. For example, in late 2017 when the Philippines government introduced the new regulation to ban the recruitment of new individual drivers, Grab responded swiftly and was permitted to continue its business. As Uber failed to respond immediately, it was suspended for one month, during which many consumers moved to Grab's platform. Although Uber later pleaded for misunderstanding the term, it was not accepted, and Uber had to pay the government 190-million Philippine peso (around $3.7 million USD) in addition to bearing the one-month suspension.
3rd Turning Point: Acquisition of Uber's Businesses in ASEAN Time frame: 2017-2018
Competition between Uber and Grab was the fiercest in 2017 as the third largest regional player, Easy Taxi, officially left ASEAN in 2016. This meant that Uber and Grab were left as the two biggest players in the market in 2017. Also, Uber left China in late 2016, meaning that by 2017 Uber shall have more resources to focus on ASEAN. The competition was so intense that both side competed to offer customers free rides in many ASEAN countries (Madhavan, 2017) . 2017 also continued to be a bumpy year for Grab and Uber, with both of them facing different kinds of protests and scandals, with detail in Appendix V.
Uber remained to be superior to Grab in many aspects. Uber had more capital from its investors, with detail in Appendix II. Uber also offered relatively higher commission fee and better technological support to drivers, and charged relatively less on passengers across ASEAN, with detail in Appendix III. Given that Uber and Grab operated in the same ASEAN countries and offered highly similar services, with detail in Appendix IV. Uber should have won the competition. However, the result showed otherwise.
In March 2018, Uber suddenly announced to sell all of its ASEAN business to Grab. The deal was strategic to Uber as developing markets like ASEAN had never been proven too profitable compared to the more mature markets like the US . By default of the deal, Uber earned 27.5% stake in Grab and Uber's CEO would be able to join as Grab's board member.
However, Uber's exit was not a well-planned move due to several observations. First, barely one month before the announcement, Uber's CEO continued to forcefully dismiss rumour of exiting ASEAN and pledged to "invest aggressively" in ASEAN while acknowledging the unprofitability of the region in the short-term. Second, Uber continued to strengthen its presence in ASEAN prior to the takeover. Uber paid a hefty fine (around $3.7 million USD) fine to end the suspension in the Philippines and continued seeking out local partners few months before the deal. Finally, the gain from the deal does not outweigh the investment Uber made in ASEAN all the years. Although Uber gained around $100 million USD from the deal, it was meager compared to the $700 million it already invested in ASEAN over the past five years (CNBC, 2018) .
On the other hand, the deal was paramount to Grab as it not only removed its greatest and fiercest competitor, but also provided Grab with access to Uber's resources and talents .
Simply being a local brand did not put Grab ahead in the game, interviews of Uber and Grab users during the price cutting campaign found that customers were fickle in brand loyalty and mostly just float to the ride-hailing company with the best discount price (Pham, 2017). Grab's ability to endure in the seven years battle against Uber and many other market players and gradually gaining an upper hand in the very end was largely due to its effort of matching its services and strategies to local culture and market condition. In the first half of 2017, Grab's app download number stood at 16 million, which considerably outpaced Uber's 9.9 million in ASEAN, according to the independent San Francisco-based mobile apps analytics firm Sensor Tower.
Success factors Success Factors/Strategies for Turning Point 1 Resolving Real Social Pain Points
From the very beginning, Grab was founded to resolve the public concern regarding the safety and service quality of taxi services, especially for female passengers, by building a platform to connect accredited taxi drivers with passengers. In interviews with the media with the two founders of Grab, Anthony Tan and Tan Hooi Ling, it is clear to have held close to heart for this social issue. The founders of Grab are raised in Malaysia, thus having a strong localized understanding on the unique cultural contexts of their country and her neighbours in order to devise suitable services for the local commuters. Grab's founders envisioned to serve the bottom of the pyramid, rather than solely trying to profit from the top notch earning population (Tung, 2015) . In contrast, Uber's entrance into the ASEAN market was positioned to provide high-class ride-hailing services. Its first entrance in ASEAN began when it offered UberBlack, the limousine ridehailing service, in Malaysia in February 2013. It was not until late 2013 that Uber tried out more diverse ride-hailing service in Malaysia. Although targeting the high-class service secures a faster financial return in the short term, starting low and serving the masses helped Grab to earn public trust and loyalty amidst competition with well-established companies like Uber and other taxi brands. Having a clear mind on the problem to resolve and an insightful understanding of the market's need allowed Grab, despite of its many inferior aspects, to develop the right technologies to match up to customers' need. This included a real time location sharing of passengers' information to their family and an emergency button to contact the closest police station. Uber did not introduce similar functions until mid-2016 and 2018 respectively.
The ASEAN market is characterized with a low overall credit card registration and usage rate and relies mainly on cash transaction. A report by UBS stated that the penetration of credit card in Thailand and Indonesia, two of the biggest markets in ASEAN, was only 5% and 6% respectively. To serve the bottom of the pyramid, Grab started by accepting cash and later grew to accept card payment in early 2016. In contrast, Uber only allowed card payment in the beginning. It did not accept cash until much later and gradually in selected countries like Vietnam in late 2015, Thailand in 2016, Singapore in 2017, etc. (Minter, 2017) . Although it is understood that Uber's rejection of cash payment was due to its concern with transaction credibility, its lack of trust in the locals meant that it lost the best chance to Grab in penetrating the ASEAN market.
Success Factors/Strategies for Turning Point 2 Liaison with the Public and Local Regulators
From the incident, it is clear that Grab had a better understanding of the importance liaising with local regulators and their expectations. In response to stricter regulation, the regional ASEAN team of Uber tried to bribe their way out of trouble. (Newcomer, 2017) While bribing may be a common way to resolve a crisis in ASEAN, Grab did not choose to handle in this way. Understanding that complying with regulations is a necessary step to the future success of the firm, Grab agreed with the government immediately. Meanwhile, Grab gained an overall higher level of trust from customers and employees after demonstrating its commitment.
Success Factors/Strategies for Turning Point 3 Understanding and meeting local needs
Five success factors for Turning Point 3, the most critical turning point, are identified and listed in the sequence below in terms of their importance in contributing to Grab's success. In particular, Grab's capability of capturing local customer's needs serves as the most crucial success factor. This is attributed to the business model of Grab, which is more than just a cellphone app that allows the transaction of ride-hailing services between riders and drivers, but it is also a customer-oriented business with a strong focus on generating great user experience by catering customer's needs and optimizing their economic efficiency.
Grab provides tailor-made services that maximize customer satisfaction and retention by understanding and adapting to the local culture and lifestyle of customers. Meanwhile, other success factors include the understanding of the needs of drivers, who are service providers that directly communicate with customers, so that they are more likely to provide ride services with higher quality, thus creating a virtuous cycle that generates better experience to customers.
Capturing local customers' needs.
In spite of similar pricing and services of Grab and Uber in 2017, Grab was much faster in uncovering the needs of consumers. For instance, to better cater to the strong family sentiment in ASEAN, of which many families commute with their children, Grab introduced GrabFamily in late 2016 to provide special cars with children seats. This was also introduced in response to the new government regulation in Singapore that the exemption of child seat requirement is not applicable to private hired cars. Uber followed suit but it was until late 2017, Uber introduced similar service called Uber Car Seat to provide special car seats for children. Another example would be GrabBike, the motorcycle version of ridehailing. Grab first launched GrabBike in Vietnam, where motorcycle is the main way of transit, in late 2011 while Uber only launched similar service called UberMoto in early 2016 as a pilot test in Thailand. The extent of Grab's willingness to cater to local market needs extended to its decision of localising its payment gateway. Grab made its first acquisition of local payment gateway in start of 2017, on the Indonesia-based company Kudo. Meanwhile, Uber did not acquire its first local payment gateway until late 2017, on the Vietnam-based Momo, despite Uber faced constant criticism for its inconvenient payment method due to its rejection of cash payment before late 2016.
Serving local needs despite the uncertain profitability.
Grab first introducing GrabHitch in late 2015 to provide rural commute service so that drivers could pick up orders on their way home through advertising their route. This did not only provide services to rural transportation, but it also allowed drivers living in suburban areas a chance to earn money during their commute back home (The Economist, 2017) . Although Uber also launched Uberpool in mid-2016, which was a carpooling service, the scope of the service remained largely in the city urban center rather than the less developed rural area, where most of the population in ASEAN reside in. Another example would be the introduction of GrabShuttle in Singapore in early 2017 which provides alternative transportation other than school buses to young children. Uber in turn did not introduce its equivalent. It is obvious that school commuting is not a highly lucrative business since only two trips are guaranteed on a school day, not to mention the high installation cost due to the much higher safety requirement for school shuttle. Grab still forego higher profitability by implementing this proposal as it realises the importance of this service to local customers.
Understanding the needs of local drivers.
The biggest obstacle for drivers to get on the ride-hailing platform is not a lack of trust in technology, but the inability to afford smartphones or technological illiteracy. Therefore, every time Grab entered a new market, Grab would provide smartphones and tutorials to teach the drivers, who then pay back through daily instalments (Minter, 2017) . Such was unheard of from Uber's side. Therefore, although Uber seems to be able to offer a relatively higher commission and more advanced interface, it could not be compared to Grab's human touch in recruiting drivers. Moreover, Uber never offered any specific welfare to cater to drivers' needs like Grab. Such could be easily found by comparing Uber's "90 days of change" with Grab's "Better 365", both introduced in 2017. Although Uber's campaign would provide drivers with more earning by driving Uber through adjusting its algorithm, Grab's campaign offered university scholarships and fuel reimbursement to Grab drivers. Grab also created plenty other welfare to drive social change, one being GrabSchool, a program to teach life skills and entrepreneurship spirits to the children of Grab's drivers. (Lin and Dula, 2016) .
Effective advertising with corporate social responsibilities initiatives.
At a lower level, Grab injected a local cultural icon into its marketing campaign to make it memorable to the users, such as setting "Goceng", referring to the IDR 5000 onenote bill, as the promotion code in Indonesia. This was positively received as the promotion was easy to remember and customers could pay easily with an IDR5000 onenote bill (Maulani, 2015) . At a higher level, Grab collaborated closely with local municipal governments to improve transportation related issues, like traffic congestion, which many ASEAN cities are notorious for. In early 2015, Grab partnered with The World Bank's Open-Traffic project to provide real-time data streaming to allow local governments better model traffic condition and understand congestion patterns. Uber did nothing in comparison to address similar issue (Lin and Dula, 2016) . This shows that Grab does not only focus on developing its own business, but also realise its obligation to fulfill social responsibility in solving the wider transportation problem in ASEAN cities. Such contribution has helped it to further localise and penetrate ASEAN markets.
Local labor acquisition.
Although Uber branded itself for granting country offices the freedom to propose and actualise localized policies and ideas, its ASEAN market lacked real decisional power for a long time. This was reflected from Uber finally creating a regional head position in ASEAN in late 2017, before that ASEAN remained largely directed by the head quarter in the US (Russell, 2017) . Uber also did not hire many locals for managerial positions. It finally hired locals to sit on senior positions in ASEAN in Indonesia in 2017. And in early 2018, it realised its problem of connecting to local users and regulatory body after facing increasing regulatory problesm, like the one-month suspension in the Philippines, and finally started to hire more local people for senior positions in Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma (Green, 2018) .
Future challenges and recommendations
Ride-hailing is a very new business model that heavily integrates the big data technology with physical on-site taxi industry. Therefore, a ride-hailing company would be confronted with many unprecedented problems, e.g. regulatory control, as compared to traditional taxi industry. The following summarises the difficulties potentially faced by Grab and the appropriate recommendation. Although problems like labour strike and customers complaints constitute a large part of factors in obstructing normal business functions, they are generic issues which context differ greatly by the geographical and jurisdiction setting. For that, the following would mainly focus on thematic issues specific to the ride-hailing industry and the business structure of Grab that are applicable in a regional sense.
Necessitated transformation in its business structure
So far the business model of ride-hailing companies in the world, including companies like Uber and Grab, mainly relied on heavy initial investment to incentivise customers and drivers to try out their platform. Although argument is put in a way that the business would be profitable once a mature penetration in the market is achieved, it is hard to foresee the time needed for the penetration given that the largest ride-hailing company, Uber, is still not showing profitability nine years after it entered the market. It is also argued that the big data harnessed from the ride-hailing business could be turned into profit, but again not much breakthrough on that aspect. Raising charge on customers and drivers are also a risky move as they would easily move on to other emerging ride-hailing or switch back to taking taxi as a result. It is foreseen that Grab would be facing a difficult time if it could not prove to be financially standalone in the nearby future.
Recommendation: The advantage of Grab over Uber on this matter is that the underdevelopment of ASEAN in many aspects, e.g. e-commerce and online banking, provides lots of possible exodus for the transformation of Grab. A most short-term solution would be including more high-revenue sideline businesses that would not affect its ride-hailing business, like online advertising and online banking, to its platform to increase its source of revenue. Grab can as well form partnerships with other established brands to share and secure diverse sources of customers, such as telecommunications and e-payment providers, and make use of network effects to generate value.
Cyber attack
One of the biggest risk would likely be cyberattack. In 2017, Uber was hacked and data of over 20 million users were leaked, which seriously indented Uber's reputation. As Grab continues to grow in scale and extend its service to the more lucrative businesses, like fintech, it would inevitably collect more sensitive customers' information, turning Grab into an attractive target for hackers. In addition to that, Grab was not known for its technological sophistication despite of its setting up of several development centers. The integration with Uber would likely expose it to more technological vulnerability, such as system loophole, in the short term if the system are not connected appropriately. Grab experienced an internal technical error in early March 2018, which affected operation in four ASEAN countries and resulted in some users switching back to using Uber. Although Grab had not yet experienced any mass scale cyber attack from external bodies, the technical failure showed that the potential impact on operation could be enormous. Thus, prior preparation would be essential to protect Grab's reputation as a reliable ride-hailing platform.
Recommendation: Although Grab is still a startup in a sense, it shall adopt a rigid risk review system to cope with its enormous growth in recent years. Some basic risk prevention methods including but not least to a better definition of role and escalation channels in time of cyberattack, adding risk rating on critical systems on its platform and those provided by third parties, more rigid internal vetting system, regular drill on possible risk scenarios, and better encryption and segregated storage of information shall be prudently considered and implemented.
Increasing regulation control
ASEAN is observed to adding on the type and complexity of regulation on hidehailing from 2016 onwards, especially concerning the interaction between ridehailing companies and local drivers. It is highly possible that there would be more mature regulation on taxing, safety compliance, and labour laws. Grab's growing presence in ASEAN would also increase possibility of regulators imposing competition law on it, as what several ASEAN government prodded into Grab for investigation after its merging with Uber. It is foreseen that probing and blockage by regulators would be a huge obstacle to the smooth operation of Grab.
Recommendation: Grab's handling of compliance with local regulators has to be essentially delicate as some are known to react radically even upon the slightest suspected variance, as shown by the Philippines government suspending Uber for one month in 2017 due to delayed and unclear reply from Uber. It is desirable for Grab to stay accountable and transparent for communicating with local regulators, including regular data disclosure to the local governments regarding their nonsensitive information like pricing policy, deals and agreements with other companies, to secure its right of continuous operation in the countries.
Continuous competition brought by entrance of new market players
Although Grab had overcame the challenge posed by Uber, there are still numerous local competitors for Grab to compete against. Go-jek would likely be Grab's biggest competitor for the years onward, as it is a $5 billion USD worth Indonesian-based ride-hailing startup that is backed by companies like Google and Tencent and likely going to expand into the Philippines in the coming year . As shown in Grab's competition with Uber, in which when one introduced certain service or promotion, the other followed straight away, the ride-hailing business could be easily replicated if the brand could not develop unique features or services to differentiate itself from the others.
Recommendation: Grab should leverage the resources and technology from Uber to advance and establish itself as the most trusted ride-hailing platform regionally. GrabPay would be the key for Grab to penetrate deep into users' usage pattern and further diversify its business into potential aspects, like e-commerce and social media, to retain users on its platform even after they move to region outside of ASEAN.
Conclusion: Going beyond Grab
Standardization appeared in plenty of scholar discussions as the strategy to streamline and uphold business service quality for corporates operating across the globe. However, as in the case of Uber losing out to Grab in ASEAN, it is evidenced that the model is limited in encompassing the profound importance of the solid understanding of local needs. Even with advanced technologies and handful of resources in hand, local knowledge and approach still excel. Although Grab belongs to a fairly new business sector, the lesson it brings forth of how an Asian new company could outrace the far more established western counterpart by thinking locally and acting strategically remain to be relevant and applicable to many others today. Grab's victory shows that there is no single answer to business success, but simply adopt methods that seems to work elsewhere and should be appealing to all in the new market, like competitive pricing or monetary incentives, would be generalising and underestimating the constantly evolving market's expectations. With Grab's merger with Uber coming to its completion, it is hoped that Grab will bear deep in mind the real reason of its success when it expands abroad or into new business sector as to prevent committing the same mistake of Uber in the recent past. (Received October 30, 2018; Revised December 23, 2018; Accepted December 23, 2018) The Economist. (2017), "Grab battles Uber in South-East Asia. The Economist."
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